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High Definition Television, Joint
Production Ventures, and the
Antitrust Barrier*

Introduction
In an address to the Economic Club of New York in February of 1989,
Attorney General Dick Thornburgh expressed the following axiom for
the emerging economic age:
[M]ore than anything else, where we have been, where we are, and where
we are going, derives from an ever-shrinking world economy governed
not just by American industrial giants, or by the government of the
United States; but governed by the decisions made in corporate board
rooms and marketplaces across the oceans, and in national capitals
around the world .... 1
Symptomatic of this new era is the decline of American dominance in
many high-technology industries. For example, foreign competitors
have driven American industries' share of the domestic phonograph
market from ninety percent in 1970 to one percent in 1989, the semiconductor market from eighty-nine percent to sixty-four percent, the
audio tape recorder market from forty percent to one percent, and the
color television market from ninety percent to ten percent. 2 The position of American manufacturers in the newly-born global market for
high definition television (HDTV) is symbolic of America's waning influence in the high technology area.
HDTV represents a potentially immense market.3 One research
group estimates that the value of this market over the next twenty years
will exceed $170 billion. 4 Although HDTV presents "a sharper picture
* Special thanks to Lisa S. Gibson and Thomas R. Jackson, Esq. ofJones, Day,
Reavis & Pogue-Dallas, for their helpful comments and suggestions.
1. Address by Attorney General Dick Thornburgh, Economic Club of New York
(Feb. 22, 1989), reprinted in 56 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 312 (Feb. 23,
1989). Attorney General Thornburgh also noted the increasing complexity of this
process incident to the anticipated unification of the European Community in 1992.

Id
2. U.S. Funds Soughtfor Advanced TV, N.Y. Times, May 10, 1989, at D1, col. 8, D6,
col. 2 [hereinafter U.S. Funds].
3. Farnsworth, The Bush Team Has Competing Ideas on Competing with Japan, N.Y.
Times, June 25, 1989, at E4, col. 1; see also Small U.S. Firms ChallengeJapanese Grip on
HDTV, Wall St. J., Oct. 23, 1989, at B1, col. 3 (predicting a $30 billion business
worldwide within a decade).
4. Farnsworth, supra note 3, at E4, col. 1.
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comparable in clarity to motion pictures," it is more than just "the next
generation of television." 5 Industry experts claim that HDTV is a truly
seminal technology, with broad applications in semiconductors, computers, telecommunications, and manufacturing equipment. 6 Because
of this potential, the American Electronics Association (AEA) warns that
"the United States will lose half of its current world-market share in
semiconductors and personal computers if it fails to control at least 10
'7
percent of HDTV production."
In an effort to help America break into the HDTV market, a cross
section of industry, government, and academic sources have recommended, along with a host of other proposals, 8 a relaxation of federal
antitrust law governing joint research, development, and production. 9
At the base of this approach lies a facially persuasive, albeit oversimplified, syllogism. American industry cannot enter the HDTV market
absent joint research into and development of a competitive product.' 0
Federal antitrust law prohibits this type of joint enterprise. Therefore,
experts argue federal antitrust law must change for American industry
to enter the HDTV market.
5. Antitrust Easing Will Be Proposedto Aid TV Effort, N.Y. Times, May 4, 1989, at AI,
col. 6 [hereinafter Antitrust Easing].
6. E.g., id.at col. 2; see also HDTV Will Drive Semiconductor Industry, 56 Antitrust &
Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 70-08 (May 11, 1989) (statement of Jack D. Kuehler, Vice
Chairman, IBM Corp., testimony before Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Comm., May 9, 1989). HDTV is important not just as a symbol, but as the driving force in a number of industries. Id.
7. Farnsworth, supra note 3, at E4, col. 2; see also High Definition Television (Part2):
HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Fin. of the House Comm. on Energy
and Commerce, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1989) [hereinafter Markey Comm. HearingsII].
"[U]nless U.S. manufacturers capture a significant share of the future HDTV market,
our preeminence in telecommunications and computers will erode." Id. (statement
of Solomon J. Buchsbaum, Executive Vice President, AT&T Bell Laboratories and
chairman of the White House Science Council).
8. The proposals range in substance from very limited, industry-specific subsidies, see, e.g., U.S. Funds, supra note 2, at D6, col. 5, to a fundamental reordering of
macroeconomic priorities aimed at increasing overall competitiveness, see, e.g., ELECTRONIC INDUSTRIES AssocIATION's ADVANCED TELEVISION COMMITTEE, CONSUMER
ELECTRONICS: HDTV AND THE COMPETITIVENESS OF THE U.S. ECONOMY, passim (Feb.

1, 1989) (recommendations submitted to Congressman Markey, Chairman House
Telecommunications and Finance Subcommittee) [hereinafter EIA REPORT]. Available from EIA's HDTV Information Center, 1722 Eye St., N.W., Washington, D.C.
20006.
9. See generally Markey Comm. Hearings II, supra note 7, at 6-7 (statement of Dr.
Robert N. Noyce, President and CEO of SEMATECH) (brief overview of the antitrust
issue).

10. The domestic industry posits that the plant and equipment necessary to initiate HDTV production would cost more than $1 billion and is thus beyond the
resources of any single American company. U.S. Funds, supra note 2, at D6, col. 4; see
also Broad Support Seen for Incentives on New TV Technology, N.Y. Times, May 5, 1989, at
D3, cols. 4-5 [hereinafter Broad Support] (statement of Albert R. Brashear, Jr., spokesman for Motorola, Inc.). In contrast, SONY has already produced over 400 HDTV
sets, U.S. Funds, supra note 2, at D2, col. 2, and has an experimental HDTV system in
operation, Farnsworth, supra note 3, at E4, col. 2. Likewise, European manufacturers
anticipate debuting their HDTV system in time for the 1992 Olympic Games in Bar-

celona. U.S. Funds, supra note 2, at D6, col. 2.
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This Note will critique these propositions and argue that, notwithstanding the emergence of a truly global economy, American antitrust
law need not be further relaxed. Section I will present the political background against which the debate over relaxing the antitrust laws is set.
No commentator suggests that American industry should avoid the
HDTV market; rather, the more fundamental debate centers on the
appropriate role of the federal government in helping specific industries
compete in the global marketplace. Section II will then examine the
importance of promoting a strong, domestic HDTV industry. Section
III, in turn, will explore both the actual and the perceived barriers
American manufacturers face in entering the HDTV market. In addition
to the antitrust laws of this nation, manufacturers point to high costs,
high risks, and the industrial policy'" of the Japanese Government as
major impediments to developing a domestic HDTV industry. Finally,
Section IV will examine the existing antitrust laws as they affect the
entry of American industry into the HDTV market and argue that no
relaxation is necessary to achieve such entry.
I.

Political Background: Does the United States Need an Industrial
Policy for HDTV?

The HDTV issue derives its peculiar significance largely from the political concern surrounding the American electronic industry's declining
competitiveness in both domestic and foreign markets.' 2 The President's Commission on Industrial Competitiveness defines competitiveness as "the degree to which a nation, under free and fair market
conditions, produces goods and services that meet the test of international markets while simultaneously maintaining and expanding the real
incomes of its citizens." 13 Thus, to be competitive, a nation must be
able to sell its goods and services consistently both at home and abroad
at prices that produce profits. Whether because of its important role in
the U.S. economy, 14 or because of America's fascination with high technology, the American electronics industry's increasing inability to compete in the global marketplace, 15 has sparked interest across Capitol
11. Industrial policy refers to a policy in which the government targets particular
industries for help. Farnsworth, supra note 3, at col. 2.
12. A comparative analysis of the decline of American competitiveness is beyond
the scope of this Note. This decline, however, is indisputable. See, e.g., U.S. Funds,
supra note 2, at D6, col. 2.
13. EIA REPORT, supra note 8, at 5 (citing PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON INDUSTRIAL COMPETITIVENESS, GLOBAL COMPETITION: THE NEw REALITY (Dec. 1984);
COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, AMERICAN'S COMPETITIVE CRISIS: CONFRONTING THE

NEW REALrITy (Mar. 1987)). Although this definition presents competitiveness as a

national concept, it could also be viewed from the perspective of a single industry or
company. Because the American electronics industry's inability to compete has risen
to the level of national political concern, a macroeconomic conception of competitiveness seems more appropriate than the more limited microeconomic conception.
14. See infra note 69 and accompanying text.
15. Notwithstanding import restrictions in the electronics industry, as well as in
many other industries, the dichotomy of domestic and foreign markets is increasingly
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Hill. Thus, as the latest innovation in the world of high technology,
HDTV naturally attracts the attention of Congress and the
Administration.
Strengthening the position of the American electronics industry in
the global marketplace stands as a major economic challenge facing the
Bush Administration. 16 Two very different approaches to this issue
exist. One approach favors a strong industrial policy of government
intervention in the form of subsidies, loans, antitrust relief, and other
support to industry, while the second approach favors a more hands-off
role for the government. 17 The disagreement between proponents of
these two approaches is fundamental and will largely determine whether
the antitrust laws will be relaxed.
A.

Structuring Relief for Multinational Corporations

The first approach, also known as the single-industry approach, presents
the further issue of how to structure relief to industries dominated by
multinational corporations (MNCs). 18 For example, antitrust relief
would benefit all manufacturers operating within the U.S. regardless of
the predominant nationality of firm ownership. Thus, a Japanese firm
operating in the U.S. could use a relaxation of American antitrust laws
designed to improve American competitiveness to further improve Japanese competitiveness. 1 9 Indeed, every benefit flowing to an American
manufacturer from a general revision of the antitrust laws would likewise flow to Japanese manufacturers operating in the U.S. Conversely,
U.S. Government loans or subsidies would benefit American-owned
manufacturers, even though such manufacturers could invest the proceeds of these loans abroad. In fact, if competitiveness is a national concept concerned with the nation's ability to compete rather than with the
ability of a particular company to compete, 20 "domestic firms can adopt
. . . strategies that weaken national competitiveness, while foreignowned firms operating in the U.S. can adopt comparable strategies that
actually strengthen the competitiveness of the United States."' 2 1 Thus,
artificial. Thus, references in this Note to the "global market" include the domestic
market as well. Where it is necessary to perpetuate a distinction in markets, however,
this Note will employ the terms "domestic" and "foreign."
16. Farnsworth, supra note 3, at E4, col. 1.
17. Id. Proponents of the "hands-off" approach argue that government relief is
both unfair and a waste of the taxpayers' money. Id.
18. EIA REPORT, supra note 8, at 7.

19. For a brief discussion of foreign participation in domestic research consortia

and suggested criteria for such participation, see Markey Comm. HearingsII, supra note
7, at 15 (statement of Dr. Solomon J. Buchsbaum).
20. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
21. EIA REPORT, supra note 8, at 7. Given the doctrine of comparative advantage,
there is "no simple or necessary relationship between the ownership of firms operating in a nation and [that nation's] competitiveness .... Id. For a precautionary

note about the EIA's sincerity, see Schreiber, Advanced Television Systems: Getting a
Share of the Market for US-Owned Companies (Feb. 1, 1989), reprinted in 135 CONG. REC.
S3481, S3484-85 (daily ed. April 6, 1989) (appended to the statement of Sen. Heinz).
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even if the federal government extends relief to the electronics industry,
it must carefully tailor its policy to improve America's competitiveness
without simultaneously generating offsetting benefits to other nations.
Crafting antitrust legislation in such a precise fashion so as to benefit only the domestic television industry22 would be virtually impossible
given the overwhelming multinational flavor of this industry. Of the
major manufacturers of television sets in the U.S., Zenith remains the
only domestically-owned firm. 23 In 1987, Thomson of France
purchased RCA from General Electric, while Philips of the Netherlands
bought Magnavox in 1975, and Philco and Sylvania in 1981.24 As of
1987, Zenith, Thomson, and Philips were the "big three" firms in the
domestic television market, accounting for roughly half of the color television sets sold in the U.S. 25 Moreover, although Japanese and Korean
companies dominate the remainder of the market, 26 these companies all
have substantial investments in U.S. facilities. 27 Proponents of relaxing
the antitrust laws to spur American entry into the HDTV market have
28
yet to address the multinational character of the television industry.
22. Effectively there is no domestic television industry at present. See NATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS

& INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION,

ADVANCED TELEVISION,

RELATED TECHNOLOGIES, AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST 13, n.9 (Mar. 1989) [hereinafter NTIA REPORT], reprinted in High Definition Television: HearingBefore the House Comm.
on Science, Space and Technology, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 67 (Mar. 22, 1989) [hereinafter
Science Comm. Hearings]. Therefore, references in this Note to the "domestic industry"
include potential entrants into the market.
23. EIA REPORT, supra note 8, at 36.
24. Id
25. Id
26. Id.
27. See id. at 37-41.
28. Another critical aspect of the multinational character of the television industry is the high domestic content of color television sets manufactured by foreign companies in the U.S. Id. at 36-37. Domestic content refers to the percentage of total
cost attributable to nationally manufactured components in a given product line. For
example, 70%6 of the components used in television sets built by Thomson are made
in the U.S. by foreign firms. Significantly, the critical electronic circuitry accounts for
the bulk of the remaining foreign content. Id.
High domestic content, however, by no means indicates American strength in the
manufacture of television components. The manufacture of television tubes is a
good example. Most producers of television tubes manufactured in the U.S. are
owned by foreign firms. See NTIA REPORT, supra note 22, at 13, reprinted at 67. The
large size and fragile nature of large-screen tubes necessitates domestic production
and assembly. See id Because the picture tube represents a major cost of television
manufacturing, as use of picture tubes manufactured in the U.S. increased, so did the
average domestic content of sets manufactured by foreign-owned firms in the U.S.
EIA REPORT, supra note 8, at 37. But HDTV may change the extent of American
manufacturing. Even though HDTV receivers will likely have larger screens, the
domestic content of sets assembled in the U.S. is likely to decline. As more durable
flat-screen displays are developed, the size and weight constraints which presently
influence foreign producers to locate production or assembly facilities in the U.S. will
disappear. NTIA REPORT, supra note 22, at 13-14, reprintedat 67-68.
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B. Opposition from the Administration
The Bush Administration presents the most significant opposition to an
industrial policy favoring either the electronics industry generally or the
television industry in particular. 29 In November of 1989 the Administration announced plans to cut all federal support for research into
HDTV from the 1990 budget.30 Additionally, notwithstanding early
speculation that the Administration would support a relaxation of antitrust law,3 1 it "remains opposed to the idea of relaxing antitrust law to
spur the competitiveness of selected industries in global markets .... 32
Nevertheless, the Administration did not completely rule out a possible
modification of the antitrust laws.3 3 In fact, it indicated a desire to
broaden the focus of reform "to include a wide range of emerging tech4
nologies," rather than to isolate HDTV for special treatment.3
C. Countering Foreign Government Support
Proponents of industrial policy argue that federal government intervention is essential to counter similar intervention by the Japanese Government.3 5 The Japanese Government clearly employs a strategy of
dominating several key technologies.3 6 "In so doing, it has hurt the cor29. The Administration has, however, evinced a willingness to formulate a
broader, "industry-led" policy in which the government would play a leading role.
Farnsworth, supra note 3, at E4, col. 2. In 1989, for example, the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the Department of Defense agency primarily
responsible for research and development of new weapons technologies, allocated
$30 million for private firm research into HDTV. Antitrust Easing,supra note 5, at D7,
col. 3. The private sector responded significantly to this allocation. Dr. Barry H.
Whalen, Senior Vice President of the Microelectronics and Computer Technology
Corp., argues that "[t]he fact that DARPA received more than 80 responses to its call
for proposals means that there are U.S. firms which are very interested in getting in
the high definition business." Markey Comm. Hearings II, supra note 7, at 21. Of
course, the large response could also indicate companies' willingness to profit from
government research contracts containing rather nebulous project requirements.
30. Fundsfor High-Definition TV Research Expected to Be Cut in Bush Budget Plan, Wall
St.J., Nov. 16, 1989, at B4, col. 3.
31. See, e.g., Antitrust Easing, supra note 5, at Al, col. 6. This speculation justifiably
sprang from Attorney General Thornburgh's speech to the New York Economic Club
in February of 1989 in which he expressly called for Congress to relax antitrust laws.
See supra note 1. Moreover, Secretary of Commerce Robert Mosbacher in an interview conducted in May of 1989 said, "There's a pretty good probability of changing
the antitrust laws." Broad Support, supra note 10, at D3, col. 5.
32. Boskin Notes Administration Opposition to Selective Relaxation of Antitrust Law, 56
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 747 (May 18, 1989) (emphasis added); see also
HDTV Debate Continues as Subcommittee Meets, Commerce Dep't Broadens Its Focus, 57 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 326 (Sept. 14, 1989) [hereinafter HDTV Debate
Continues].
33. HDTV Debate Continues, supra note 32, at 370.
34. Id.
35. The Japanese manufacturers are the dominant force in the emerging HDTV
market. Therefore, although European manufacturers are far ahead of their American counterparts, this Note focuses more on the Japanese manufacturers and the
policies of the Japanese Government than on the European industry and the policies
of the EEC.
36. Farnsworth, supra note 3, at E4, col. 3.

1991

Joint Production Ventures and the Antitrust Barrier

responding American industries by closing the Japanese market, forcing
competitors to trade technology for limited market access and using the
sanctuary of its protected domestic market to develop economies of
scale." 3 7 This strategy has paid handsome rewards in the color television, automobile, consumer electronics, and semiconductor industries.3 8 The Japanese now hope to achieve with HDTV what they have
already accomplished in other industries.3 9 Thus, proponents of a
strong industrial policy contend that the federal government must take
action before the American electronics industry is permanently shut out
of the HDTV market.
Opponents of the single-industry approach counter that governments in general are ill-equipped to gauge the wants and needs of the
consuming public. As Murray Weidenbaum, former Chief Economic
Advisor to President Reagan, contends, "[o]ne thing . . .democratic

political systems cannot do well at all is to make critical choices between
particular firms and industries." 40 As an example of the dangers of this
approach, opponents of government intervention cite the effort of
Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) in the early
1960s to keep Mazda and Honda out of the automobile business 4 1
MITI simply underestimated the growth of the export market. 42 Opponents also argue that the current competitive strength of targeted industries did not result from Japan's industrial policy, but from the rising
Japanese Yen which forced companies to improve productivity and cut
costs. 43 As perhaps the major objection to a single-industry approach,
opponents note the danger of a misallocation of scarce capital
resources. In a perfectly competitive market, investment funds for
research and development tend to flow to those projects most likely to
generate a profitable return.4 4 A single-industry approach, however,
"could drain investment funds away from crucial projects in more prom37. Id at cols. 3-4. Most proponents of an industrial policy do not advocate
adopting the extremely protectionist stance ofJapan. In the U.S., where consumption drives the economic engine, a strong concern for the consumer prevents such a
radical stance. But cf Crane, Joint Research and Development Ventures and the Antitrust
Laws, 21 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 405, 409 (1984) (Japanese not oblivious to benefits of
competition). Protectionism restricts the consumer's freedom of choice and thus
necessarily results in higher prices. However, most proponents of an industrial policy do argue that retaliatory trade barriers should be one component of any trade
policy. Indeed, the U.S. has already labelled Japan, along with Brazil and India, an
unfair trader as a result of its barriers to sales of American goods. Comment, StructuralImpediments to United States-JapaneseTrade: The Collision of Culture and Law, 23 CoRNELL INT'L L.J. 55, 69 n.109 (1990).
38. Farnsworth, supra note 3, at E4, col. 4. 'Japan's recent success in the semiconductor industry also stems in large measure from a combination of governmentbacked loans and research subsidies ...." Crane, supra note 37, at 409.
39. Farnsworth, supra note 3, at E4, col. 4.
40. Id. at col. 5.
41. Id. at cols. 4-5.

42. Id.at col. 5.
43. Id.
44. The market for investment capital rests upon the critical assumption that market actors have perfect information. Conversely, one familiarjustification for govern-
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ising fields and channel [them] into potential HDTV boondoggles.

'45

II. The Role of HDTV in Improving American Competitiveness
Apart from the single-industry debate in Washington, the validity of
HDTV as a panacea for American industry must be examined. 4 6 Proponents of fostering a domestic HDTV industry promise a dramatic
improvement in America's competitive posture. A careful analysis of the
relationship between HDTV, the electronics industry generally, and the
47
economy as a whole supports this claim.
A.

High Definition Technology as a Consumer Good

The economic significance of HDTV as a consumer good depends, of
course, on generating sufficient demand for the product. 48 Most analysts argue that, given the right conditions, HDTV will penetrate the
household market quite rapidly. 49 The initial high price is likely to slow
ment intervention is market failure. Thus, misallocation of resources is an empirical
issue, which cannot be satisfactorily resolved with theory alone.
45. Heritage Foundation Study Recommends Antitrust Relief to Ease HDTV Development,
57 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 212 (Aug. 17, 1989) [hereinafter Heritage
Foundation Study]; see also Science Comm. Hearings, supra note 22, at 31 (statement of
Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications and Information Alfred
Sikes). One reason the Heritage Foundation recommends antitrust relief is because,
as long as it is not industry-specific, such relief avoids the problem of potential misallocation of resources. HeritageFoundation Study, supra, at 212. To the extent that antitrust law is a restriction on the free market, this conclusion is accurate. However, if
antitrust law is really a restriction on market failure, the conclusion that misallocation
is avoided is no longer valid.
46. This Note assumes, solely for analytical purposes, that the proponents of the
single-industry approach will prevail. If the opponents of the single-industry
approach prevail, then the issue of government intervention in the HDTV industry
becomes moot. Only after the government decides generally that it must intervene
in certain industries does the question of which industries need intervention become
relevant.
47. Whether HDTV will in fact produce the dramatic repercussions promised is
an empirical question which this Note does not presume to answer. This Section
merely presents the arguments supporting such a relationship.
48. See Science Comm. Hearings, supra note 22, at 25 (statement of Rep. Boehlert).
Representative Boehlert, an avid supporter of governmental support for HDTV, cautions, "history is full of advances that found no market-from telephones that transmit pictures to quadrophonic sound." Conversely, he also relates the story of Harry
Warner, who reputedly reacted to his brother's suggestion of adding sound to silent
pictures with the immortal line, "Who the hell wants to hear actors talk?" Id.; see also
Schreiber, supra note 21, reprinted at S3484-85 (discussing the potential of the HDTV
market).
49. NTIA REPORT, supra note 22, at 9, reprinted at 63. A number of factors will
affect the rapidity with which HDTV will penetrate the household market. Among
these are such obvious elements as price, quality, consumer incomes, and the availability, quality, and prices of complimentary products and services. Two less obvious
but far more important factors are the widespread availability of the equipment and
infrastructure necessary to distribute and receive HDTV programming and the spectrum standards adopted by the relevant governmental entities. Id.
The role of broadcast standards presents a completely separate topic of analysis.
See generally, High Definition Television: The InternationalHDTV Standard-Setting Process
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market penetration; however, one analyst notes that "HDTV sets, in current dollars, will cost no more than monochrome sets in 1947 or color
sets in 1954."50 Moreover, "as we proceed down the learning curve, the
price of sets will fall to a model increment over conventional receivers of
the same picture size." 5 1 Indeed, a study commissioned by the Department of Commerce projects that over ninety percent of U.S. households
will purchase an HDTV receiver within twenty years after introduction
of the product. 52 Similar studies by the American Electronics Associa-

53
tion and the Electronic Industries Association support this estimate.
Based on these estimates and projections, it seems quite likely that
HDTV will create a strong household demand and will eventually
replace the modern color television set as the receiver of choice. As
discussed in the introduction to this Note, the potential value of the
entire HDTV market is immense. 54 In attaching a dollar value specifically to the household market for HDTV, the Commerce Department
study analyzed two different diffusion scenarios. The first scenario, premised on "sluggish" diffusion, projects a total market value of between
$1 and $5 billion within fifteen years after introduction. 55 The second
scenario, premised on "rapid" diffusion, projects a cumulative value of
$25 to $51 billion
over the same fifteen-year period. 56 Assuming
"rapid" diffusion 5 7 and accepting the midpoint of the high and low estimates, the Commerce Department expects the cumulative value of the
household market to exceed $100 billion within twenty years after intro-

and the Role of InternationalStandards on U.S. Competitiveness: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Int'l Scientific Cooperation of the House Comm. on Science, Space, and Technology, 101st
Cong., Ist Sess. 33 (1989); Schreiber, supra note 21, reprinted at S3481. There is no
technical necessity of using any given standard, but receivers must be manufactured
to meet whatever standard is chosen. Professor Schreiber of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology argues that historically these standards have been used to control
markets. Id. at S3485. The Europeans, for example, have been able to retain much
more of their domestic television industry than has the U.S. largely because of their
choice of broadcast standards. Id. The Japanese advocate global adoption of their
NHK system for use in HDTVs. Id. at S3484. Professor Schreiber contends that
"while a U.S.-generated standard would not guarantee U.S. participation [in the
HDTV market], a Japanese standard would make it harder for American companies
to have any market share at all." Id. at S3485.
50. Schreiber, supra note 21, reprinted at 53484.
51. Id. Professor Schreiber expressly conditions this prediction on the adoption
of appropriate broadcast standards. Id. at S3486 n.5.

52. DARBY Assoc., ECONOMIC POTENTIAL OF ADVANCED TELEVISION PRODUCTS
(Apr. 1988), cited in NTIA REPORT, supra note 22, at 10, 11, reprinted at 64, 65. The
Darby report developed a model using the growth histories of other consumer electronics such as color televisions, home computers, satellite receiving antennae, stereo
audio systems, and very large-screen, projection television receivers. Id.
53. Id. at 10, reprinted at 63.
54. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
55. NTIA REPORT, supra note 22, at 11, reprinted at 65.
56. The Commerce Department's assumption of the "rapid diffusion" scenario
follows from its conclusion regarding market penetration, supra note 52 and accompanying text, and is supported by various other projections, supra notes 49-53 and
accompanying text.
57. NTIA REPORT, supra note 22, at 11, reprinted at 65-66.
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duction with annual sales within the same period exceeding $15
58
billion.
B.

Other Benefits of High Definition Technology to the Electronics
Industry

Focusing on household consumption alone grossly underestimates the0
6
5 9 As Dr. Barry Whalen of MCC
full potential of the HDTV market.

argues, "[tihe view of high definition systems merely as passive receptors that will give consumers a better picture on their television sets is
much too limiting-high definition systems represent key, generic technology." 6 1 Many non-entertainment products require the use of video
images of extremely high resolution, clarity, and fidelity. 62 These are

precisely the qualities HDTV offers. Thus, HDTV has vast potential
downstream application in computers, satellite photography, remote
sensing and monitoring, command and control displays, surveillance
and security, and medical diagnostics and imaging. 6 3 While there are no
estimates of the dollar value of high definition technology in nonentertainment applications, such applications clearly represent a substantial additional market which must be included when projecting the
true value of HDTV.
As HDTV technology improves the quality and capability of various
downstream products, demand for those products will increase. 64 As
product demand increases, demand for components will increase as
well. 6 5 Because HDTV, like many electronic products, is semiconductor
58. Id. at 11, reprinted at 66. One element of this immense household market is
the new economic value arising out of existing film production libraries. "[A]n entire
new generation of video cassettes are likely to be created from the existing movie
library in the new [HDTV] format... Id. at n.7.
59. See Schreiber, supra note 21, reprinted at S3484.
60. Microelectronics and Computer Technology Corp.
61. Markey Comm. Hearings II, supra note 7, at 18. Dr. Whalen used the term "systems" rather than "television" to better express the full breadth and scope of the
technological advancements high definition imaging offers. He proposes to expand
the view of this technology to "include advanced software programming, transmission systems, receiver and processor architecture, and digital imaging technology."
Id
62. NTIA REPORT, supra note 22, at 6, reprinted at 60.
63. Id. For a graphic depiction of the potential downstream applications of
HDTV technology, see id. (chart). Dr. Whalen suggested the following visualization:
We must think of the doctor viewing images of the brain to understand the
effects of a head injury; we must think of the aircraft designer being able to
visually represent how a change to a wing or flap design will effect the aerodynamic properties of an airplane; we must think of the officers aboard a
carrier having realistic and reliable information with which to make better
decisions while in battle.
Markey Comm. Hearings II, supra note 7, at 18. Recent events in the Persian Gulf further underscore the HDTV potential.
64. Cohen, The Consequences of Failingto Develop a Strong HDTV Industry in the United
States, reprinted in 135 CONG. REC. S3481, S3482 (daily ed. April 6, 1989) (Economic
Policy Institute Briefing Paper, appended to statement of Sen. Heinz).
65. Id.
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intensive, 66 the demand for semiconductors should rise sharply as high
definition technology spreads through the electronics industry. 6 7 This
increased demand would yield a significant competitive advantage to
68
firms which produce semiconductors for HDTV and similar products.
Thus, as high definition technology spreads throughout the electronics
industry, the entire industry will benefit.
The electronics industry plays an important role in the national
economy. 69 It employs more people than any other manufacturing
industry in the U.S.. 70 Unfortunately, "American companies have withdrawn little by little from [this] market leaving [the country] with virtually no presence in this booming field."' 7 1 Electronics imports constitute
an increasingly larger fraction of the U.S. trade deficit, 72 clearly evincing

American industry's retreat. It is against this background that the full
import of high definition technology begins to emerge. A general rise in
demand throughout the industry, spurred by the widespread use of high
definition technology, would likely precipitate a concomitant increase in
both profitability and domestic employment. 73 Conversely, failure to
develop a strong HDTV industry could result in a $225 billion trade
deficit in electronics alone by 2010 and a loss of more than two million
66. NTIA REPORT, supra note 22, at 7, reprinted at 51; see also Cohen, supra note 64,
at S3462 (noting the increased use of semiconductors necessitated by the incorporation of HDTV technology into products such as personal computers).
Semiconductors are essential to the production of a vast multitude of products
ranging from industrial robots and computers to video games and VCRs. Beyond
the role of necessary components in other products, semiconductors also serve as a
"major source of innovation in products and processes throughout the economy."
EIA Report, supra note 8, at 25-26.
67. See NTIA REPORT, supra note 22, at 7, 15-17, reprinted at 61, 69-71; Cohen,
supra note 64, at 53482. The importance of high definition technology to the semiconductor industry cannot be overstated.
The ability and interest of U.S.-based semiconductor firms to service markets
for consumer-related semiconductors [has] virtually disappeared. By the
mid-1980s, only six percent of the semiconductor production in the United
States went to consumer applications, whereas in Japan, 40 percent did. In
dollar terms, this meant thatJapan was producing 7.2 billion consumer chips
in 1987 while the U.S. produced only 0.9 billion. The corresponding figure
for Europe was around four billion.
EIA REPORT, supra note 8, at 31. "Because HDTV requires extremely complex circuitry, production of sophisticated chips will generate massive revenues for the semiconductor industry." 135 CONG. REC. E996 (daily ed. Mar. 23, 1989) (statement of
Rep. Brown).
68. NTIA REPORT, supra note 22, at 7, reprinted at 61.
69. 135 CONG. REC. H731 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1989) (statement of Rep. Mineta).
70. Markey Comm. HearingsII, supra note 7, at 34 (testimony of Dr. Noyce).
71. See 135 CONG. REC. H730 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1989) (statement of Rep.
Boehlert).
72. Id
73. Id. at H731 (statement of Rep. Mineta). See generally DARBY Assoc., ECONOMIC
POTENTIAL OF ADVANCED TELEvIsION PRODUCTS (Apr. 1988), reprinted in High Definition
Television: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Fin. of the House Comm.
on Energy and Commerce, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 62, 94-97 (1989) [hereinafter Markey
Comm. HearingsIII].
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jobs per year.74
MI.

Actual and Perceived Barriers to American Industry's Entry into the
HDTV Market

Many barriers, both real and perceived, stand between American firms
and the emerging HDTV market. Two such barriers, according to the
domestic electronics industry, are the relatively high research, development, plant, and equipment costs; 7 5 and the extent to which foreign

competition is bolstered by large-scale government support. 76 Industry
leaders argue that the only way to overcome these obstacles is through
joint production of HDTV receivers. 7 7 The industry further contends
that American antitrust laws are overly restrictive and thus inhibit joint
production. 78 Accordingly, the best way to foster American entry into
the HDTV market is to relax the antitrust laws to allow joint production
and marketing of HDTV systems. This Section will briefly examine
these alleged barriers to determine their validity, while Section IV will
specifically analyze whether antitrust law in fact bars domestic entry into
79
the HDTV market.
A. High Costs and High Risks
The precise costs and risks associated with American industry's entry
into the HDTV market are unknown. The AEA claims that the investment in factories and equipment necessary to begin HDTV production
would cost in excess of $1 billion.8 0 However, this figure is deceptive.
An AEA proposal to Congress apparently contemplated a consortium,
consisting of over thirty firms including such corporate giants as AT&T,
IBM, and Motorola, 8 ' joining forces to construct a nationwide system of
manufacturing facilities.8 2 Notwithstanding consistent claims that no
firm could enter the market alone,8 3 the potential cost to a single firm
74. Cohen, supra note 64, at S3482.
75. U.S. Funds, supra note 2, at D6, cols. 4-5. The American Electronics Association claims that the factories and equipment necessary to start an HDTV operation
would cost in excess of $1 billion and would thus be beyond the resources of any
single manufacturer. Id.
76. Id at col. 5.
77. In fact, the electronics industry would apparently prefer federal loans and
subsidies. See id. This solution is, however, beyond the scope of this Note.
78. See, e.g., Antitrust Easing,supra note 5, at D7, col. 2.
79. Whether or not joint production is, in fact, necessary to American industry's
entry into the HDTV market, the antitrust laws are properly viewed as a third barrier
because they may increase the risk facing a potential market entrant.
80. U.S. Funds, supra note 2, at D6, cols. 4-5. The AEA also calls for an additional
$300 million to be channeled into the industry's research effort through DARPA. Id.
at col. 5.
81. See id. at D 1, col. 6.
82. See id. at D6, col. 5.
83. See, e.g., Broad Support, supra note 10, at D3, col. 5 (statement of Albert
Brashear, Motorola, Inc.).
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entering the market has yet to be determined.8 4 Until a realistic cost
figure for a single firm's entry into the market is advanced, it is virtually
impossible to assess the industry's claim that the risk of entry is too high
for one firm to bear. To encourage antitrust revisions and other governmental assistance, industry spokesmen confidently project a multi-billion dollar market,8 5 capable of both revitalizing the domestic
electronics industry and reasserting America's competitive might in the
global economy. How a market so immense and so promising could be
so risky as to utterly preclude single-firm entry remains a mystery. Congress has apparently failed to consider the implications of the data put
before it by the American electronics industry. In essence, a great deal
of ink has been spilled in newspapers, in industry reports, and by the
Congressional Printing Office, apparently without adequate attention to
the validity of the claims raised by the electronics industry.
The high cost claimed by the electronics industry has certainly not
hampered all domestic efforts to enter the HDTV market-research and
development seems to be proceeding apace. In April of 1989, for example, scientists at the David Sarnoff Research Center demonstrated the
86
first broadcast system for HDTV that is compatible with existing sets.
While this by no means indicates that the domestic industry is ready to
compete in the global marketplace, it will allow the FCC to develop
domestic broadcast standards without waiting for overseas development. 87 Moveover, while the major American manufacturers may have
all but conceded the HDTV receiver market to Japan and the EEC, small
domestic manufacturers are challenging foreign firms in developing the
flat-screen technology essential to HDTV production. 88 Indeed,
"almost all of the basic technology relating to high-definition television
has come from U.S. laboratories." 89 On the software side, Eastman
Kodak has developed "a convertor that can transform conventional
motion picture film into high-definition video." 90 Thus, while American
84. Perhaps it is significant that Zenith, the only major domestic producer of television sets, did not contribute to the funding of the AEA's report, although a Zenith
spokesman later said that the report "appear[ed] consistent with our position." U.S.
Funds, supra note 2, at D6, col. 5.
85. See, e.g., Kodak Enters HDTV Market with ConverterforMovie Film, Wall St.J., Oct.
23, 1989, at B4, col. 4 [hereinafter Kodak Enters HDTV Market].
86. Antitrust Easing, supra note 5, at D7, col. 2.
87. ld.
88. Small Firms ChallengeJapanese Grip on HDTV, Wall St.J., Oct. 23, 1989, at B1,
col. 3.

89. Id. at col. 4. Peter Brody, President of Magnascreen Corp. and formerly of
Westinghouse, says thatJapanese firms sit poised to snatch HDTV technology as fast

as American labs develop it, thus suggesting that the most fundamental problem may
be one of adequately protecting intellectual property.
90. Kodak Enters HDTVMarket, supra note 85, at B4, col. 3. Ironically, Japan's first
major move into the software side of the HDTV industry was Sony's purchase of
Columbia Pictures for $3.5 billion. See 135 CONG. REc. S15896 (date?) (testimony of
Daniel Burstein before the Senate Banking Committee) (appended to statement of
Sen. Wirth).
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industry may face high barriers to entering the HDTV market, those barriers are apparently not prohibitive in every segment of the market.
Before any change in the antitrust laws should be considered, much
more concrete information about entry costs is needed to make rational
legislative decisions. At a minimum, precise estimates of such costs
should be demanded. Furthermore, these estimates should be broken
down into the different submarkets of HDTV. For example, the
software market, the receiver market, and the flat-screen display market
may each present distinct barriers and opportunities, to say nothing of
the many non-entertainment markets. Such additional information
should also be sought from more objective sources than the electronics
industry. A staggering amount of information supporting the absolute
need for joint production ventures in order to enter the HDTV market
derives from industry sources. 9 1 Obviously, the electronics industry is
in the best position to ascertain the precise costs of entry, and the
figures claimed by the industry may well be accurate. But to change the
antitrust laws based solely upon the claims of an industry with an economic interest in changing these laws is foolish.
B.

Foreign Competition, Industrial Policy, and Antitrust Law

Unlike the costs of entry, foreign government support of HDTV producers is well documented. 9 2 For example, the Commerce Department
estimates that the Japanese have spent over $1 billion on HDTV
research alone. 9 3 Industry analysts argue that, because of this type of
governmental support of foreign industry, "it is no longer logical for
[the U.S. federal government] to avoid supporting those industries that
are critical to the future growth and development of [its] industrial
base." 94 As Professor Schreiber of MIT points out, "in Japan and
Europe, where most [HDTV] development has been done, no one
expects industry to do it by itself. In both places, government has taken
an active role in planning, coordinating, and funding research and
development activities in government and private laboratories." 95
91. Even the Commerce Department's study relies to a large measure on statistics
provided by the Electronics Industries Association of Japan.
92. See, e.g., U.S. Funds, supra note 2, at D6, col. 5; see also NTIA REPORT, supra note
($54 million in aid allocated by MITI to research and develop
22, at 18, reprintedat
fiat-screen display panels).
One significant disadvantage American firms face in virtually every industry is the
grossly one-sided trade barriers erected around such potentially lucrative markets as
Japan and Korea. See, e.g., Farnsworth, supra note 3, at E4, col. 6. In terms of fiatscreen display panels, domestic manufacturers face tariffs of up to 15% when selling
panels in Japan, whereas Japanese panels enter the U.S. duty-free. Small Firms Challenge Japanese Grip on HDTV, Wall St.J., Oct. 23, 1989, at B2, col. 4.
93. Small Firms ChallengeJapanese Grip on HDTV, supra note 92, at B1, col. 4.
94. Cohen, supra note 64, at S3483.
95. Schreiber, supra note 21, reprintedat S3484. But see Science Comm. Hearings,supra
note 22, at 24 (statement of Rep. Boehlert) (The Japanese government funds only
2% of industrial research, while the U.S. government funds 35% of domestic industrial research).
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Clearly then, American industry does face the prospect of entering a
market dominated by what amount to government-industry part96
nerships.
That foreign industry enjoys governmental support, however, does
not necessarily translate into an increased entry barrier for American
firms. Initially, the bulk of foreign governmental assistance occurs at the
research and development stage of a product's evolution. Both the
Commerce Department's estimate and Professor Schreiber's observation refer to governmental support of research and development, not of
production. Once a Japanese product reaches the market there is little
evidence of further government funding. Moreover, just as theJapanese
have benefitted from American technological advances, American firms
can benefit from Japanese innovations. As Japanese electronics firms
put high definition receivers on the market, they simultaneously put
technological information on the market. 9 7 Japan's investment in its
own industry's research and development efforts may therefore decrease
the costs American industries face in similar endeavors. 98 The American electronics industry has yet to establish that Japan's investment in
HDTV research and development actually raises barriers to the HDTV
market for American firms. Clearly, government support minimizes the
possibility of undercapitalization. But, until a definite link is established
between Japan's aid to its industry and American firms' inability to enter
the HDTV market, it would be inappropriate to conclude that such foreign assistance warrants a relaxation of American antitrust law.
Finally, the American electronics industry argues that foreign antitrust laws permit joint HDTV-production ventures among foreign firms,
while American antitrust law prohibits such ventures. As a result, the
electronics industry contends that American firms suffer an unnecessary
comparative disadvantage. In fact, foreign laws differ dramatically in
this respect. The EEC, for example, completely protects from antitrust
scrutiny joint production ventures involving firms holding market shares
96. One additional factor which the American electronics industry points to as a

justification for government assistance is the amount of private capital foreign firms
have invested in HDTV. "Japan's electronic industry has spent more than $500 million on HDTV and has just announced a program to spend another $700 million just
on the development of advanced HDTV screens." 135 CONG. REC. H730 (daily ed.
Mar. 21, 1989) (statement of Rep. Mineta). Similarly, "European consortia are
spending $100 to $200 million a year on their development programs." Id. One
possible conclusion to be drawn from these figures is that, contrary to what the
domestic industry claims, the factories and equipment necessary to enter the HDTV
market do not cost $1 billion. A second possible conclusion is that foreign firms are
willing to risk private capital for research and development to reap the promised
rewards notwithstanding the availability of government funds. Put another way, in
the words of Lawrence A. Kudlow, Chief Economist at Bear, Steam & Company, "An
industry which cannot get normal private bank loans and credits is not worthy of
government assistance." U.S. Funds, supra note 2, at D6, col. 4.
97. See E. SULLIVAN & H. HOVENKAmP, ANTrrRusT LAw, Poucv AND PROCEDURE
295 (1989).

98. Id.
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of twenty percent or less. 99 Conversely, Japan rarely permits joint production ventures at all. t0 0 As for U.S. antitrust law, the prospect of
treble damages arguably discourages joint manufacturing generally.' 01
For example, to a businessperson contemplating entering a production
consortium, perceived antitrust vulnerability can be as real a barrier to
entry as actual antitrust vulnerability. The validity of this argument is
the focus of Section IV.
IV. Must American Antitrust Law Be Relaxed to Foster American
Industry's Entry into the HDTV Market?
This Section argues that existing antitrust laws would not prohibit joint
HDTV production ventures and therefore concludes that no change in
current antitrust law is necessary.
The joint venture is perhaps one of the most nebulous forms of
business association. Black's Law Dictionary defines a joint venture as a
"one-time grouping of two or more persons in a business undertaking
• . . [that] does not entail a continuing relationship among the parties."' 1 2 Such a broad definition includes everything from cartels to
trade associations to partial mergers. 10 3 In essence, it covers "all of
antitrust except, perhaps, some single firm attempts to monopolize or
monopolizing conduct."' 1 4 Likewise, a joint venture can be formed for
virtually any purpose: to buy, sell, research, explore, promote, license,
regulate, produce. Labelling a business arrangement a "joint venture"
does little to further antitrust analysis. 10 5
99. Heritage Foundation Study, supra note 45, at 212.
100. Rill Asserts Administration Is Still Working onJoint Production Ventures, 57 Antitrust
& Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 370 (Sept. 21, 1989) (testimony of Claude E. Barfield, Dir.
of Science and Technology Policy Studies, American Enterprise Institute). Japan
does allow joint research and development, but joint research and development and
joint production are distinct situations which should not be confused. Id.
101. Antitrust Easing, supra note 5, D7, col. 2.
102. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 753 (5th ed. 1979). "The very definition of a joint
venture is unclear. More than a simple contract yet less than a merger.., the key
element is continuity ... [of the] association of two or more persons to carry on as
co-owners an enterprise for one or a series of transactions." Brodley, The Legal Status
ofJoint Ventures under the Antitrust Laws: A Summary Assessment, 21 ANTITRUST BULL. 453,
454 (1976) (quoting J. TAUBMAN, THE JOINT VENTURE AND TAX CLASSIFICATION 83
(1957)). For a more precise functional definition of ajoint venture, see Brodley,Joint
Ventures and Antitrust Policy, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1523, 1526 (1982) [hereinafter Brodley,
Joint Ventures].
103. See Pitofsky,Joint Ventures under the Antitrust Laws: Some Reflections on the Sign ificance of Penn-Olin, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1007, 1007 (1969) [hereinafter Pitofsky, Joint
Ventures].
104. Pitofsky, A Frameworkfor Antitrust Analysis of Joint Ventures, 74 GEO. L.J. 1605,
1605 (1986) [hereinafter Pitofsky, Framework];see also P. AREEDA, ANrITRUST ANALYSIS
361, at 360 (2d ed. 1974) (joint venture is an expansive notion). See generally Note,
A Definitional Test forJoint Ventures, 31 WAYNE L. REV. 1251 (1985) (reviewing judicial
attempts at defining a joint venture and proposing a definition applicable to the antitrust context).
105. See Brodley,Joint Ventures, supra note 102, at 1524; Pitofsky, Framework, supra
note 104, at 1605-06. "[P]rocompetitive and anticompetitive possibilities are so
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The joint venture contemplated by the American electronics industry would entail the cooperative production of high definition products
by a large number of companies,' 0 6 perhaps even a nationwide consortium. The industry argues, however, that the possibility of suffering an
award of treble damages under the antitrust laws 10 7 inhibits the formation of such a joint venture.10 8 Firms generally contend that antitrust
law does not dearly delineate between permissible and prohibited cooperation. 10 9 Even if the law does not prohibit joint production ventures,
when industry executives perceive a threat from the antitrust laws, they
tend to avoid such cooperative endeavors at the margin. For example,
extensive testimony before Congress antecedent to passage of the
National Cooperative Research Act of 198411 indicated that industry
avoided joint research and development ventures due to the uncertainty
of antitrust laws." 1 One industry spokesman noted that "even among
those who believe that our antitrust laws do not--or at least under reasonable application should not-inhibit cooperation in R&D, there is
general agreement that many business executives perceive such laws as
significant barriers to joint research. They thus shy away from such
activities .... 1112 Thus, uncertainty surrounding the application of the
3
antitrust laws may inhibit legitimate undertakings."1
great that attaching the label 'joint venture' . . . tells one virtually nothing useful
about the likely legality of an arrangement under the antitrust laws." Id.; see also
Note, supra note 104, at 1251 (addressing precisely this problem).
106. U.S. Funds, supra note 2, at D6, col. 5.
107. Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1988), provides that any damages awarded under any of the antitrust laws of the U.S. shall be trebled.
108. Antitrust Easing, supra note 5, at D7, col. 2.
109. "[A] common assertion of American business for many years has been that
'[u]ncertainty as to what is and what is not legal often forces business decision-makers to turn down profitable ventures in order to avoid costly and time-consuming
court determinations.'" Crane, supra note 37, at 411 (quoting The Present State, Current Theory and Trends of InternationalAntitrust Laws: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. of theJudiciary, 93rd Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 1418
(1973 & 1974)). Indeed, as one industry spokesman noted, "[iun dealing with legal
questions, business executives can live with almost any arbitrary rule-they won't like
it, but they can adjust to it. But they abhor uncertainty." Id. at n. 29 (quotingJapanese Technological Advances and Possible United States Responses Using ResearchJoint Ventures:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Investigations and Oversight and the Subcomm. on Science,
Research and Technology of the House Comm. on Science and Technology, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. 191, 264 (1983) (statement of Steven Olson, Assoc. Gen. Counsel of Control
Data Corp.)); see also Brodley,Joint Ventures, supra note 102, at 1534 (courts and commentators have yet to articulate a single approach to the analysis of joint ventures
under the antitrust laws).
110. 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301-05 (1989).
111. See generally Comment, The National CooperativeResearch Act of 1984: A New Antitrust Regime for Joint Research and Development Ventures, I Hi-TE CH L.J. 133, 140-41
(1986) (Act designed to assuage industry's concern regarding uncertainty of antitrust
laws application to joint research and development ventures).
112. S. REP. No. 427, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 3105, 3106-07 (statement of Steven Olson, Assoc. Gen. Counsel of
Control Data Corp.).
113. Pitofsky, Framework, supra note 104, at 1605.
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The electronics industry's apprehension regarding the application
of the antitrust laws to joint HDTV production ventures raises several
distinct questions. If the industry's perception is valid and the antitrust
laws do substantially inhibit cooperative HDTV production, do the laws
need to be changed to encourage joint production or is HDTV joint
production sufficiently anticompetitive to justify maintaining the status
quo? Conversely, if the industry's perception is invalid and the antitrust
laws do not inhibit cooperative production of HDTV and related products, then the question becomes whether the law should be changed to
alter perceptions or perceptions should be changed while retaining
existing law.
A.

The Sherman Act

Section one of the Sherman Antitrust Act 14 prohibits "[e]very contract,
combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
... ,1115 Because virtually every commercial contract can be read to
restrain trade or commerce, 116 the Supreme Court has construed the
Act to prohibit only those restraints which by their nature, purpose, or
effect are unreasonably anticompetitive.' t 7 Courts thus apply a rule of
reason to determine whether a business arrangement violates the Sherman Act." 18 As a combination within the scope of the Sherman Act, 1 19
joint ventures have generally been accorded rule-of-reason treatment
114. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-11 (1989).
115. Id.
at § 1.
116. See Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918); United
States v. Topco Assoc., 405 U.S. 596, 606 (1972).
117. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911); United States v.
American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 109, 115-16 (1911).
118. Topco, 405 U.S. at 606-07 (citing Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 1). A rule of reason
analysis minimally includes "consideration of the facts peculiar to the business in
which the restraint is applied, the nature of the restraint and its effects, and the history of the restraint, and the reasons for its adoption." Id.at 607 (citing Chicago Bd. of
Trade, 246 U.S. at 238).
In contrast to the rule of reason, certain restraints have been found so inherently

anticompetitive as to be unreasonable per se. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States,
356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). Among those practices which have been held unreasonable per
se are: horizontal price fixing, United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S.
150 (1940); tying arrangements, International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392

(1947); concerted refusal to deal, Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S.

207 (1959); horizontal market allocations, White Motor Co. v. United States, 372
U.S. 253 (1963); and retail price maintenance, Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145
(1968). Although the rationale behind some of these categories is questionable,

plaintiffs strive to characterize challenged restraints as deserving of per se treatment.
Once a plaintiff proves a per se violation, any pro-competitive elements of the
arrangement become irrelevant. Conversely, defendants struggle to characterize the
challenged restraints as not deserving per se treatment, thus enabling them to proffer
redeeming pro-competitive virtues.
119. Pan Am. World Airways v. United States, 371 U.S. 296 (1963). "Joint ven-

tures may be combinations in violation of the antitrust laws." Id. at 307 (citing
Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 598 (1951)).
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when attacked under section one. 120 Because most joint ventures offer
substantial pro-competitive benefits as well as anticompetitive risks,
12 1
analysis under the rule of reason is appropriate.
On the pro-competitive side, a joint production venture, like a
merger, may create substantial efficiencies of integration without eliminating the parent firms.' 22 The venture may achieve economies of scale
or synergies resulting from the joint use of complementary
resources. 12 3 It may also provide "capital formation advantages that
result from risk sharing."' 24 And, of course, the distribution of risks
among parent firms may facilitate entry into new markets that would be
125
prohibitively risky absent a joint venture.
Obviously, not every joint venture will produce pro-competitive
benefits. Indeed, given the relatively lenient treatment joint ventures
receive under the antitrust laws, 12 6 the "joint venture" label may mask
otherwise clearly anticompetitive behavior. 12 7 Consequently, anticompetitive risks must be weighed against pro-competitive advantages.
120. "[C]ombinations such as mergers, joint ventures, and various vertical agreements, hold the promise of increasing a firm's efficiency and enabling it to compete
more effectively. Accordingly, such combinations are judged under a rule of reason
...." Copperwald Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768 (1984)
(dicta); see also NCAA v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984);
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1 (1979); Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United
States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933); Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231
(1918); Pitofsky,Joint Ventures, supra note 103, at 1045; Note, supra note 104, at 125355; Brodley, Joint Ventures, supra note 102, at 1535-36. Even though a joint venture
may be accorded rule of reason treatment, the activities of the venture may nevertheless be subjected to per se treatment. See, e.g., Arizona v. Maricopa Medical Soc'y,
457 U.S. 332 (1982) (maximum price fixing scheme promulgated by joint venture
held unlawful per se); Timken, 341 U.S. at 593 (global market allocation by joint venture held unlawful per se).
121. Brodley,Joint Ventures, supra note 102, at 1525.
122. Pitofsky, Framework, supra note 104, at 1606; see also Brodley, Joint Ventures,
supra note 102, at 1528 (a joint venture can achieve many of the advantages of a
merger with fewer disadvantages).
123. Pitofsky, Framework, supra note 104, at 1615; see, e.g., Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 295 (1985) (wholesale
purchasing cooperative permitted economies of scale in both purchase and warehousing of wholesale supplies).
124. Pitofsky, Framework, supra note 104, at 1615.
125. Id. at 1606-07; Note, supra note 104, at 1256. "[A]t least in some market settings, joint ventures serve useful purposes by permitting independent enterprises to
combine capital, tangible assets, know-how, sales organizations, and the like in order
to surmount the difficulties of entry and expansion in new markets." Pitofsky, Joint
Ventures, supra note 103, at 1008; see also In re Brunswick Corp., 94 F.T.C. 1174
(1979), aff'd and modified on othergrounds sub nom., Yamaha Motor Co. v. FTC, 657 F.2d
971 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 915 (1982). "The combined capital, assets,
or know-how of two companies may facilitate entry into new markets and thereby
enhance competition, or may create efficiencies of new productive capacity unachievable by either alone." Brunswick, 94 F.T.C. at 1265.
126. Note, supra note 104, at 1253-54.
127. See, e.g., Timken, 341 U.S. at 593.
Nor do we find any support in reason or authority for the proposition that
agreements between legally separate persons and companies to suppress
competition among themselves and others can be justified by labeling the
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On the anticompetitive side, joint ventures increase the risk of collu129
and market exclusion.'5 0
sion,1 28 the loss of potential competition,
Parent firms may tend to "stifle what would otherwise be independent
future growth of the joint venture or one of the parents."' 3'1 The joint2
5
venture may also confer significant market power on the parents.'
And, of course, the joint venture almost necessarily eliminates competition between the parent firms "with respect to the activities for which
the joint venture was organized." ' 3 3 Thus, if society is to realize the
enhanced competition joint ventures may provide, courts must carefully
project a "joint venture." Perhaps every agreement and combination to
restrain trade could be so labeled.
Id. at 598.
128. E. SULLIVAN & H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 97, at 294; see, e.g., United States v.
Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 F. Supp. 947 (D. Mass. 1950) (joint venture used
to exchange information). Professor Pitofsky refers to this risk of collusion as "spillover" effects with respect to competition among the parent firms. Pitofsky, Framework, supra note 104, at 1608. Professor Brodley argues that the risk of collusion
poses the greatest anticompetitive danger "because a joint venture can provide a
singularly effective vehicle for cartelization." Brodley,Joint Ventures, supra note 102,
at 1530.
129. E. SULLIVAN & H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 97, at 294; see also United States v.
Penn-Olin Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964) (joint venture challenged under section 7 of
Clayton Act). See generally Pitofsky, Joint Ventures, supra note 103 (discussing the doctrine of potential competition in light of Penn-Olin).
130. E. SULLIVAN & H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 97, at 294; see also Timken, 341 U.S.
593 (joint venture used to divide world markets); United States v. Imperial Chem.
Indus., 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (joint venture used to divide world
markets).
131. Pitofsky, Framework, supra note 104, at 1608. The Supreme Court has
observed that "[r]ealistically ...
parents would not compete with their progeny."
Penn-Olin, 378 U.S. at 168. Moreover, Professor Pitofsky points out that "the parents
usually will agree, expressly or implicitly, not to compete directly with their joint
venture, and each parent has the capacity to block the joint venture from expanding
into fields in which the parent earns profits." Pitofsky, Framework, supra note 104, at
1610; see, e.g., United States v. Pan Am. World Airways, 193 F. Supp. 18 (S.D.N.Y.
1961) (parent's suppression of competition fromjoint subsidiary held unlawful under
Section 2 of the Sherman Act), rev'd on other grounds, 371 U.S. 296 (1963).
Several commentators and courts have focused on the issue of parental control.
Professor Pitofsky, for example, argues that the degree of integration should be a key
determinant of a joint venture's reasonableness. The Eighth Circuit, in Yamaha
Motor Co. v. FTC, 657 F.2d 657, 980 (8th Cir. 1981), required that a joint venture
"bring to the market an additional independent decisionmaker .... " Another commentator argues that "[s]ociety and commerce are not benefited if the same economic efficiencies could have been obtained without taking [the] risks associated with
joint ventures." Note, supra note 104, at 1260.
132. See, e.g., Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945); see generally Pitofsky, Framework, supra note 104, at 1607, 1612-13 (discussing rights of access to joint
ventures possessing substantial market power). The risk of the creation of market
power through the formation of ajoint venture is clearly similar to the risk of market
exclusion. See supra note 130 and accompanying text. In both cases, non-participating firms are placed at an unfair competitive disadvantage. Notwithstanding this similarity, the two risks are distinct in that the former risk fails to address those situations
in which a parent firm already has substantial market power. See, e.g., Berkey Photo,
Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093
(1980).
133. Pitofsky, Joint Ventures, supra note 103, at 1012.
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scrutinize challenged ventures to ensure that pro-competitive benefits
outweigh anticompetitive risks.
An industrywide HDTV consortium, as envisioned by the American
electronics industry, would likely withstand scrutiny under the Sherman
Act. The advantages and disadvantages specific to such a venture indicate that on balance it likely would prove to be pro-competitive, and
hence, a reasonable restraint on competition.
1.

PotentialPro-Competitive Benefits of an Industrywide HDTV Consortium

A consortium formed to produce an American HDTV system for the
global market would offer most of the pro-competitive benefits mentioned above. 134 The integrative efficiencies available through careful
selection of venture partners could be substantial. For example in February of 1989, AT&T and Zenith launched a joint venture to produce
HDTV technologies. 13 5 This particular venture benefits from the complementary "technological prowess" of both parent firms.' 3 6 AT&T
provides telecommunications and microelectronics experience, 1 3 7 while
Zenith presumably contributes the experience in and basic facilities for
television manufacturing. Although either parent, given adequate
resources, could have purchased or developed expertise similar to that
of the other parent,1 38 the joint venture form eliminates the costs and
business disadvantages of such acquisitions. Thus by combining complementary expertise, the AT&T/Zenith joint venture is better able to
overcome the technological barriers to entering the HDTV market than
either parent independently. Because HDTV draws on a variety of distinct technologies, i.e., semiconductors and flat-screen displays, and has
many potential applications, 1 3 9 the possible integrative efficiencies
available through an industrywide consortium are substantial.
134. "Full integration, and hence the highest level of likely efficiencies, usually occurs

where two companies agree to create a completely new facility for the manufacture
and sale of a product." Pitofsky, Framework, supra note 104, at 1619 (emphasis
added).
135. Markey Comm. Hearings II, supra note 7, at 13 (statement of Mr. Buchbaum,
Exec. V.P., AT&T Bell Laboratories).

136. See id. at 15.
137. See id. Because AT&T expects HDTV receivers to be "interconnected to the
national telecommunications network the way telephones, data terminals and computers are interconnected today," the AT&T/Zenith joint venture should be well
poised to take advantage of two distinct aspects of the HDTV market, the receiver

market and any networking applications. See id. at 14.
138. See Pitofsky,Joint Ventures, supra note 103, at 1014-15.

While the[ ] advantages [of complimentary resources] can be obtained by a
single company at a price-funds can be acquired in the capital market, patent licenses or distribution contracts can be negotiated, unpatented "knowledge" can be purchased outright or hired, a secure source of raw materials
can be obtained through long-term contracts-the joint venture format may
still be preferred.
Id.
139. See supra notes 6 & 63 and accompanying text.
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An industrywide consortium formed for the production of HDTVs
would also offer significant capital formation and risk sharing advantages. 140 From the perspective of private lenders and the equity markets, the broader expertise and capital base of a multi-firm joint venture
would likely make the joint venture a more attractive investment than a
single company's individual attempt to enter the HDTV market.' 4 1
From the perspective of the parent firms, a joint venture would spread
risk over several firms and thus make entry much more likely. 142 Consider, for example, the joint licensing ventures challenged in Broadcast
Music, Inc. v. Columbia BroadcastingSystem.' 43 Individual holders of copyrighted musical compositions formed Broadcast Music (BMI) and the
American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers (ASCAP) as
clearinghouses for licensing compositions. Combined, the two agencies
held nonexclusive licenses to virtually every domestic copyrighted composition. 1 44 A firm, such as CBS, would purchase a blanket license, usually from BMI and ASCAP, which authorized using any composition in
the licensing agency's repertoire. In explaining the barriers facing individual copyright holders, the Supreme Court observed that "those who
performed copyrighted music for profit were so numerous and widespread, and most performances so fleeting, that as a practical matter it
was impossible for the many individual copyright owners to negotiate
with and license the users and to detect unauthorized users." 1 4 5 The
Court found that the joint licensing ventures substantially lowered sales
and enforcement costs and thus created efficiencies completely unavailable to the individual copyright holders.' 4 6 The proposed HDTV consortium could produce benefits comparable to the blanket licensing
agreements in BMI. If the entry costs are as substantial as claimed, an
industrywide consortium formed to produce high definition technolo140. "Joint ventures are particularly appropriate vehicles to undertake projects
involving high risks, technological uncertainty, and high information costs." Crane,

supra note 37, at 415; see also Brodley,Joint Ventures, supra note 102, at 1529.

141. See Pitofsky,Joint Ventures, supra note 103, at 1014. "To take an extreme example, market prospects for a new service or product may be so forbidding that no
single enterprise could secure financing for.., independent entry." Id.
142. See, e.g., id. Although the question of whether a firm would have entered the
market absent a joint venture involves complicated issues of proof, see generally id. at
1024-28, as a "practical business matter a joint venture may on occasion facilitate
market entry." Id. at 1015. In the Sherman Act context, therefore, to the extent the

availability of the joint venture form enhances the possibility of entry by several firms
not currently in the market, the enhanced prospect of entry should always be considered a pro-competitive benefit of the venture. Conversely, however, any concomitant
decrease in possible independent entry is an anticompetitive disadvantage. In the
Clayton Act context, the possibility of independent entry takes on a much larger role.
143. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).

144. Id at 5.
145. Id. at 4-5.
146. Id. at 21. On remand, the Second Circuit held that the blanket licensing ventures did not create an unreasonable restraint because the individual transaction
costs were too high for individual licensing to work competitively. CBS, Inc. v.

American Soc'y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 620 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 970 (1981).
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gies would likely spur entry that might be impossible for any single firm
acting individually.
Whether an industrywide HDTV consortium would yield economies
of scale is uncertain. HDTV manufacturing will almost certainly be technology intensive. 14 7 The optimal productive capacity of a manufacturing facility capable of meeting the technological needs of HDTV
production, however, presents an empirical question far beyond the
scope of this Note. Nevertheless, the electronics industry has argued
that economies of scale enjoyed by foreign firms are one of the barriers
to entry to the HDTV market. 148 If this is true and the average cost of
one large foreign firm is lower than the average cost of numerous small
domestic firms, then an industrywide HDTV consortium would yield
another pro-competitive advantage by achieving economies of scale
unavailable to the individual parent firms.
2. Anticompetitive Risks of an Industrywide HDTV Consortium
The anticompetitive aspects of joint HDTV production appear minimal. 149 First, the risk of collusion between parent firms entering the
HDTV market is limited. As a matter of economic logic, collusion
between parent firms can restrain trade only when those firms are in the
same market. 15 0 Where parent firms are not in competition, there is no
motivation to collude. Because Zenith is the only significant domestic
television manufacturer, firms participating in an HDTV consortium are
likely to come from many different segments of the electronics

industry.151
When competing firms enter the same joint venture, the risk of collusion increases. 152 It would be naive to suggest that joint ventures
have not been used to mask collusive behavior. 153 However, as Professor Pitofsky argues "there are so many opportunities for competitor collaboration already available to business managers so inclined that it
seems unwarranted to give much weight to the additional opportunity
supplied by regular meetings among representatives of the parent com147. See, e.g., NTIA REPORT, supra note 22, at 15-16, reprinted at 32-33 (comparing
the memory capability of an HDTV receiver to that of a one megabyte Apple Macintosh computer).
148. Significantly, the industry has not claimed that economies of scale are the
primary barrier. Indeed, it is the industrial policies of Japan and the EEC that the
industry points to as the most significant barriers. See supra notes 92-95 and accom-

panying text.
149. Loss of potential competition is primarily a concern of the Clayton Act and
therefore will be discussed in subsection 2, infra, rather than in this subsection which
focuses on the Sherman Act.
150. See Pitofsky, Framework, supra note 104, at 1609-10 (providing examples of collusion within an industry between competingjoint venture parents).
151. The AT&T/Zenith joint venture stands as a good example. As firms in two
completely unrelated product markets, the prospect of collusion between AT&T and
Zenith are minimal. See supra notes 135-38 and accompanying text.
152. See generally Brodley, Joint Ventures, supra note 102, at 1530-31 (discussing

mechanics of collusion).
153. See, e.g., supra note 130.
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panies in connection with the joint venture's business affairs."' 5 4 Moreover, any risk of collusion should be discounted by its possible effect on
competition. Given the weak competitive position of the domestic electronics industry relative to foreign producers, 155 successful collusion
between parent firms in competition with one another is unlikely.1 56 In
summary, any increased risk of collusion through participation in a joint
HDTV production venture poses little danger to competition and,
standing alone, does not outweigh the substantial pro-competitive benefits of such a venture.
Similarly, an industrywide HDTV consortium would present little
risk of excluding competitors from the HDTV market. Excluding a competitor from the market generally requires market power.' 5 7 A domestic
HDTV consortium would have little market power given existing foreign
competition. Even if such a consortium did develop substantial market
power, current antitrust jurisprudence provides rights of access to exclusive joint ventures under certain circumstances. 1 5 8 Additionally, should
parent firms use their position in the HDTV joint venture to exclude
competitors in their primary markets, 15 9 current antitrust law is
154. PitofskyJoint Ventures, supra note 103, at 1033.
155. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
156. It is important to recall that participation in ajoint venture does not preclude
an independent challenge to collusive behavior between parent firms. For example,
should IBM and Apple conspire through their participation in ajoint HDTV venture
to raise the price of computer software, their collusion would be subject to the most
rigorous per se analysis, United States v. Soconoy-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150,
224 n.59 (1940), notwithstanding the fact that the joint venture would enjoy the benefit of the more forgiving rule-of-reason treatment.
157. See Brodley,Joint Ventures, supra note 102, at 1532. Consider the development
joint venture challenged in Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263
(2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980). Kodak held a monopoly in the
photographic film market but not in the camera market. Sylvania approached Kodak
with an offer to jointly develop a revolutionary "magicube" flash device. As a condition to Kodak's participation in the joint venture, Kodak prohibited Sylvania from
disclosing the "magicube" technology to other camera manufacturers, Berkey, 603
F.2d at 300 (General Electric later approached Kodak with proposals for a similar
new flash), thus effectively excluding them from the market for cameras capable of
using the "magicube" flash device. The jury found this exclusionary behavior an
unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of the Sherman Act. Berkey Photo, Inc. v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 457 F. Supp. 404, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
158. See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945); United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 224 U.S. 383 (1912). "[A] joint venture cannot exclude
competitors from participation in the venture itself, nor deny access to the output of
the venture if such participation or access is critical to the survival of those competitors." Crane, supra note 37, at 421; see also United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co.,
524 F. Supp. 1336, 1352-53 (D.D.C. 1981) (firm controlling critical facility or "strategic bottleneck" must provide access to competitors on "fair and reasonable terms");
cf. Interface Group v. Massachusetts Port Auth., 816 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1987) (limiting
right of access to an essential facility to actual and potential competitors). See generally
E. SULLIVAN & H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 97, at 590-92. But see id. at 340-41 (suggesting that joint ventures producing new products should not be treated as a group
boycott).
159. An example of such a practice is predatory pricing.
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equipped to handle such anticompetitive behavior 160 without affecting
the legality of the joint venture. 16 1 Thus, the possibility of HDTVjoint
ventures excluding competition from the HDTV market does not raise a
significant anticompetitive barrier.
Firms participating in an industrywide HDTV consortium are also
unlikely to "stifle what would otherwise be independent future growth
of the joint venture or one of the parents"' 62 because of the structure
of the television industry and the probable composition of ajoint HDTV
production venture. First, a parent firm competing in a market other
than television would not be threatened by a highly competitive HDTV
consortium. 163 On the contrary, because HDTV promises to be a technology driver, parent firms are more likely to push the consortium to
maximum competitiveness. By stifling the competitive growth of the
joint venture, the non-television parent risks losing both consortium
profits and the technological innovations flowing from the venture.
Indeed, these innovations are a primary justification for forming an
HDTV consortium in the first place. 164 It is simply economically illogical for a parent firm, not threatened by the competitive posture of the
consortium, to hamper the flow of innovative technologies which may
give it a competitive advantage in its own markets. Second, even if a
parent firm was in direct competition with the HDTV consortium, i.e., a
firm that manufactures television sets, it is doubtful that such a firm
could seriously stifle the competitive posture of the consortium. In an
industrywide venture, the threatened parent is but one voice out of
many. Thus, the pro-competitive interests of non-television parent
firms would mitigate the anticompetitive interests of a threatened parent. Furthermore, should one parent succeed in stifling the growth of
the joint venture "there is adequate authority under the antitrust laws to
deal effectively with the problem."' 65 The likely composition of an
industrywide HDTV consortium, however, stands as the most significant
protection against a parent firm stifling the joint venture's competitive
abilities.
In summary, the Sherman Act does not present a major threat to
the formation of an industrywide HDTV consortium. Under this Act
courts typically apply the rule of reason standard to joint ventures and
balance the pro-competitive benefits of the joint venture against the
anticompetitive risks. On balance, an industrywide HDTV consortium
would offer substantial pro-competitive benefits, while the anticompetitive risks are minimal. Included among the likely benefits are significant
integrative efficiencies derived from the combination of parent firms'
160. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2, & 45 (1988).
161. See Brodley,Joint Ventures, supra note 102, at 1534.
162. Pitofsky, Framework, supra note 104, at 1607.

163. "[Ihe probability of ...

stifling ...

will tend almost to disappear as that

relationship approaches being purely conglomerate."

note 103, at 1037-38.
164. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
165. Pitofsky,Joint Ventures, supra note 103, at 1038.

Pitofsky, Joint Ventures, supra
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complementary resources, capital formation and risk sharing advantages
which lower entry barriers and thus foster additional competition and
economies of scale. Furthermore, the likely composition of an HDTV
consortium, the structure of the American television industry, and the
nature of the HDTV market mitigate any anticompetitive risks of collusion, market exclusion, or stifling ofjoint venture or parent firm growth.
As long as parent firms avoid patently anticompetitive activities such as
price fixing, market allocation, and boycotting, a joint HDTV production venture is unlikely to violate the Sherman Act.
B.

The Clayton Act

While the Sherman Act attacks anticompetitive behavior after the fact,
Congress intended the Clayton Act to arrest anticompetitive behavior in
its incipiency.' 6 6 Section 7 of the Clayton Act outlaws corporate amalgamations of any kind 1 67 which have a tendency "substantially to lessen
competition" in any "line of commerce" in any "section of the country."' 6 8 Because a joint venture is in effect a quasi-merger, 169 it is subject to independent challenge under the Clayton Act.17 0 While the same
17 1
general considerations apply in both merger and joint venture cases,
a joint venture is not controlled by precisely the same criteria as a
merger or conglomeration.' 72 "The merger eliminates one of the participating corporations from the market while a joint venture creates a
new competitive force therein."' 7 3 Nevertheless, a joint venture which
withstands scrutiny under the Sherman Act may be invalid under the
74
Clayton Act.'
166. United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 258 F. Supp. 36, 60 (S.D.N.Y.
1966).
167. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 342 (1963); see also

Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962) (fountainhead of most analysis
under Section 7).
168. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1988).
169. Pitofsky,Joint Ventures, supra note 103, at 1007.
170. United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964) (first direct challenge of a joint venture under Section 7 to reach the Supreme Court). "The joint
venture, like the 'merger' and the 'conglomeration,' often creates anticompetitive
dangers. It is the chosen competitive instrument of two or more corporations previously acting independently and usually competitive with one another." Id. at 169.
Penn-Olin involved a joint venture formed by Pennsalt Chemicals and the Olin
Mathieson Company to produce and market sodium chlorate in the Southeastern
United States. Pennsalt manufactured sodium chlorate in other parts of the U.S.,
while Olin Mathieson produced a number of chemicals other than sodium chlorate.
Id. at 162-63.
171. Id. at 170.
172. Id
173. Id.
174. See, e.g., id. at 161. Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Penn-Olin,joint

ventures challenged under the Sherman Act were seldom found unlawful, even if
they amounted to outright price fixing or market allocation cartels. Pitofsky, Joint
Ventures, supra note 103, at 1018.
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1. Area of Effective Competition
To invalidate a joint venture challenged under the Clayton Act, a plaintiff must demonstrate "a 'tendency' toward monopoly or the 'reasonable
likelihood' of a substantial lessening of competition in the relevant mar-

ket .

. . .

175

The first step in analyzing a joint venture's legality is to

ascertain its relevant product and geographic markets. 176 A product
market defined solely as HDTV receivers would be unreasonably narrow.177 Indeed, because the "outer boundaries of a product market are
determined by the reasonable interchangeability of use... between the
product itself and substitutes for it,' ' 178 the relevant product market
should minimally include all television receivers.1 79 To fully evaluate

the competitive effects of an industrywide HDTV consortium,' 8 0 the relevant product market should be broader and include the full spectrum

of high definition applications ranging from HDTV receivers to medical
imaging equipment.' 8 ' While high definition technology may have
many end uses, "high definition" represents but one industry, with one
group of competitors. 18 2 As long as the primary technology remains the
same, the particular product mix at any given time is of little consequence for antitrust purposes.18 3 As to the relevant geographic market,
175. Penn-Olin, 378 U.S. at 171. An actual restraint on competition need not be
proved. L
176. See id. at 161-62; see also Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 324
(1962) (proper definition of the market is a "necessary predicate" to examination of
competition affected by a horizontal merger).
177. "[Ilt is improper 'to require that products be fungible to be considered in the
relevant market.'" United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 449 (1964)
(quoting United States v. DuPont, 351 U.S. 377, 394 (1956)). Consider, for example,
staples and paper clips. Both products serve the same purpose-they bind papers.
Obviously, however, they are not completely interchangeable. Each product will
have particular end uses that cannot be satisfied by the other. Papers needing permanent binding might require staples, while paper clips would be inappropriate. Nevertheless, staples and paper clips would quite likely be considered together as one
product market because they are substantially competitive across a broad spectrum of
uses.
178. Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 325.
179. HDTV is, after all, projected to ultimately replace the present generation of
television receivers. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
180. See Continental Can, 378 U.S. at 457.
181. See supra notes 6, 59-63 and accompanying text.
182. Even if the HDTV industry eventually split into distinct manufacturing
groups (for example, HDTV manufacturers, flat-screen display manufacturers, and
medical imaging equipment manufacturers), the capacity of manufacturers of one
type of high definition product would have to be factored into the product market
definition of other types of high definition products. For example, a sufficient
increase in the quantity demanded of HDTV receivers could encourage manufacturers of medical imaging equipment to retool their factories to produce HDTVs.
183. "Where the area of effective competition cuts across industry lines, so must
the relevant line of commerce; otherwise an adequate determination of the merger's
true impact cannot be made." Continental Can, 378 U.S. at 457.
To illustrate the importance of proper market definition, consider the Supreme
Court's decision in Continental Can. This case involved, among other things, a dispute
over the proper product market definition in a merger between a manufacturer of
metal cans and a manufacturer of glass containers. The government argued for ten
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high definition systems would most likely be sold on a global market.
However, because the antitrust laws are concerned with competition
within the U.S., limiting the relevant geographic market to the U.S.
seems appropriate.' 8 4 In summary, to fully examine the competitive
effects of an industrywide HDTV consortium the relevant product market should include high definition systems generally, and the relevant
geographic market should encompass the entire U.S. 18 5
2. SubstantialLessening of Competition
Once the area of effective competition is defined, 186 the impact of the
joint venture on this area of competition must be analyzed as of the time
of suit.1 8 7 The formation of a joint venture may lessen competition in

the relevant market in two ways. First, the venture may eliminate the
possibility of any of the parent firms independently entering the market,
thus affecting actual competition. 188 Second, the venture may eliminate
the competitive effect of a parent firm sitting on the edge of the market
poised and ready to enter the market, thus affecting potential competition. 1 89 The practical result of these considerations is that a court will
separate product market definitions including the can industry, the glass container
industry, and a number of end-use product markets, i.e., beer containers. The
Supreme Court, however, held that because of the "existence of a large area of effective competition between the makers of cans and the makers of glass containers," the
appropriate product market included both metal and glass containers. Id at 456.
The Court held, "complete inter-industry competitive overlap need not be shown."
Id. at 457. In both the metal and the glass container industries, the form of the final
product could differ, while serving essentially the same purpose-packaging. Likewise, in the HDTV industry the particular end use may be radically different, while
serving essentially the same purpose-ultra-high resolution graphic imaging. See
supra note 62 and accompanying text.
184. See, e.g., Continental Can, 378 U.S. at 447 (geographic market consisted of the
entire U.S.).
185. Whatever the product or geographic market, foreign competition must be
factored in. Some courts have been reluctant to consider foreign competition, but
such reluctance in the market for high definition systems would be utterly unsupportable in light of the overwhelming multinational flavor of the electronics industry in
general and the television industry in particular.
186. Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 294 (discussing the area of effective competition).
187. Penn-Olin, 378 U.S. at 168; United States v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co.,
353 U.S. 586, 607 (1957); see also Continental Can, 378 U.S. at 458 (merger must be
viewed functionally in context of a particular market, including its structure, history,
and probable future).
188. Pitofsky,Joint Ventures, supra note 103, at 1013; Pitofsky, Framework, supra note
104, at 1609.
189. "The existence of an aggressive, well equipped and well financed corporation
engaged in the same or related lines of commerce waiting anxiously to enter an
oligopolistic market would be an substantial incentive to competition which cannot
be underestimated." Penn-Olin, 378 U.S. at 174; see also FTC v. Proctor & Gamble
Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967) (merger between Proctor & Gamble and Clorox Chemicals
Co. invalidated because Proctor & Gamble's presence on the edge of the liquid
bleach industry exerted a significant competitive influence on the market). See generally Tenneco, Inc. v. FTC, 689 F.2d 346 (2d Cir. 1982) (discussing two types of
potential competition).
As to whether a parent firm would have entered the joint venture's market absent
the joint venture, some courts look to that firm's subjective intentions, see, e.g., Ten-
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determine the legality of a joint venture by looking at the relevant market and speculating as to whether the market is less competitive with the
joint venture than it would have been without the joint venture.
In an effort to simplify this speculative task, Professor Pitofsky
argues that where no parent firm competes in or is a likely entrant into
the market served by the joint venture, the venture should be treated as
legal per se. 190 In such a case, the joint venture definitionally "adds a
new competitor and productive capacity where none otherwise would
have existed."'1' If HDTV production is, in fact, too costly for domestic
firms to enter the market individually, then according to Professor Pitofsky's reasoning, an industrywide consortium should be legal. 19 2 There
are, however, at least two practical problems with this analysis. First,
courts have not adopted this approach, and second, it is uncertain
whether entry is too costly for individual firms. Nevertheless, if the prohibitive cost claims of the electronics industry are valid,' 93 then even
under the Clayton Act's vague standard it is almost inconceivable that a
joint HDTV production venture would be judged to substantially lessen
competition in the HDTV market-for precisely the reason Professor
Pitofsky stated.
Even assuming that at least one firm in an industrywide HDTV consortium would have entered the HDTV market on its own, a successful
challenge to the consortium is unlikely. Since the Supreme Court's decision in Penn-Olin,'9 4 courts have severely restricted the availability of the
potential competition doctrine.19 5 To show a substantial lessening of
competition' 96 in the joint venture's market, a plaintiff must prove that
97
(1) the market in which the joint venture operates is non-competitive,'
(2) other competitors in the market would have perceived the nonentering parent as a likely potential entrant,' 9 8 (3) the nonentering parent
would have been one of the most likely entrants into the relevant marneco, Inc. v. FTC, 689 F.2d 346 (2d Cir. 1982); and B.A.T. Indus., 104 F.T.C. 852,
927-28 (1984), while other courts examine the issue from an objective perspective,
i.e., what would a reasonable firm have done under the circumstances. See In re
Grand Union Co., 102 F.T.C. 812, 1057-60 (1983); and In re Heublein, Inc., 96
F.T.C. 385, 585-86 (1980). See generally Pitofsky, Joint Ventures, supra note 103 (arguing in favor of an objective approach).
190. Pitofsky, Framework, supra note 104, at 1609.
191. Id.
192. In such a case there would be no loss of actual or potential competition.
193. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
194. 378 U.S. 158 (1964).
195. See Pitofsky, Framework, supra note 104, at 1609.
196. Whether one firm entered thejoint venture's market on its own or as a parent
of the joint venture, there would be but one actual competitor. As such, the only way
in which competition could be lessened is through the elimination of the potential
competition from firms which decline to enter the market because of the joint
venture.
197. Pitofsky, Framework, supra note 104, at 1609. If the market were competitive,

then the presence or absence of one additional firm would be irrelevant.
198. Id. If the firms in the relevant market were unaware of a potential competitor's threat, then the competitor would have no impact on the market participants'

behavior.

354
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ket, 199 and (4) the nonentering parent would likely have had a substantial pro-competitive effect on the market had it not entered the joint
venture. 20 0 If the structure of the emerging HDTV market mirrors the
current television market, then it will likely be highly competitive. 20 ' As
a result, any challenge to a domestic HDTV joint venture would likely
fail on the potential competition test's first prong. Assuming that the
market was not competitive, a plaintiff would likely falter on the second
requirement. The American electronics industry's loud proclamation of
its inability to individually enter the HDTV market 20 2 lessens the
probability that Japanese or European manufacturers would perceive
American firms as potential market entrants. The current status of the
domestic television industry20 3 reinforces this point. Thus, challenging
a joint venture under Section 7 of the Clayton Act would present a
2°4
daunting task for an aggrieved plaintiff.
Assuming the claims of the American electronics industry are
valid, 20 5 Section 7 of the Clayton Act poses no real danger to U.S. firms
hoping to enter the HDTV market through the formation of an industrywide HDTV consortium. Section 7 only prohibits joint ventures which
tend substantially to lessen competition. The nonexistence of a domestic high definition industry and the competitive nature of the emerging
high definition market create a virtual safe harbor from Clayton Act liability. Domestic firms that have sufficient resources to enter the HDTV
market on their own, but are unwilling to enter the market except in the
form of a joint venture, face greater liability risks under Section 7. Even
these risks, however, are minimal.
199. Id If several firms on the edge of the relevant market had a pro-competitive
effect on the market, the presence or absence of any one firm on the edge would
make little difference to the market participants' behavior. As fewer and fewer firms
remain on the edge of the market, this requirement becomes progressively easier for
a plaintiff to prove.
200. Id. at 1610 (citing United States v. Marine Bancorporation,418 U.S. 602 (1974)).
201. See Schreiber, supra note 21, reprinted at S3484.
202. See id
203. See id
204. Even if a loss of potential competition were likely to result from the formation
of a joint venture, Professor Brodley argues that there may be no net competitive
loss.
The joint venture as a new economic actor provides an actual addition to
competition that must be weighed against anticompetitive effects that are
only probabilistic. Moreover, joint venture entry is immediate, whereas the
hypothesized potential entry by parent firms may occur only after some delay.
This factor defers and reduces the benefits of the new entry. It follows that
potential competition injury alone will seldom make a joint venture competitively suspect ....
Brodley,Joint Ventures, supra note 102, at 1532 (citation omitted). See generally R. PosNER, ANTrIRusT LAw: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 113-17 (1976) (joint venture

unlikely to cause significant loss of potential competition).
205. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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Conclusion
High definition television represents an immense market in which the
U.S. electronics industry should participate. The primary entry barrier,
according to the electronics industry, is that no individual firm can
afford the start-up costs. To overcome these prohibitive costs, the
industry proposes to form a consortium to produce and market high
definition systems. The U.S. electronics industry points to the industrial
policies and antitrust laws ofJapan and the EEC as additional evidence
of the need for a joint venture approach in the U.S. The domestic electronics industry claims that these policies and laws allow foreign manufacturers to form precisely the type of cooperative endeavors necessary
to enter the emerging HDTV market. Conversely, the industry complains that the antitrust laws of the U.S. prohibit the formation of an
industrywide HDTV consortium. Accordingly, the industry contends
that these laws must be relaxed, or the American electronics industry
will simply be unable to enter the lucrative HDTV market, thus further
eroding the declining competitive position of the U.S. in global markets.
A closer examination of U.S. antitrust law indicates that these laws
are in actuality not a barrier to the formation of an industrywide HDTV
joint venture. Under the rule of reason analysis, the pro-competitive
aspects of an HDTV consortium substantially outweigh any anticompetitive risks. Therefore, such a venture would likely withstand a challenge
under the Sherman Act. Similarly, assuming the claims of the electronics industry are valid, the formation of an industrywide consortium to
produce high definition systems could not conceivably substantially
lessen competition in the HDTV market. An HDTV consortium would
therefore likely survive a challenge under the Clayton Act as well. In the
final analysis, American antitrust laws present no real barrier to the formation of an industrywide HDTV joint venture. On the contrary, the
antitrust laws were enacted to foster competition, 20 6 and this goal fully
accords with the American electronics industry's goal of entering the
HDTV market through the formation of an industrywide HDTV consortium to produce high definition television and related products.
David R. Gibson

206. "[Ihe freedom guaranteed each and every business, no matter how small, is
the freedom to compete-to assert with vigor, imagination, devotion, and ingenuity
whatever economic muscle it can muster." United States v. Topco Assoc., 405 U.S.
596, 610 (1972); see also United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321
(1963). "Congress determined to preserve our traditionally competitive economy."
Id. at 371. As long as a joint venture furthers the aims of competition, then the
antitrust laws pose no barrier to the formation of such a venture.

